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Corporate equity and ﬁ  nancial stability:






This article is based on a study conducted jointly by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Banco d’Espana,
the Centrale dei Bilanci (Italy) and the Banque de France under the aegis of the European Committee of 
Central Balance Sheet Ofﬁ  ces.1 It looks at companies’ resilience in the event of an exceptional cyclical shock.
The article starts by outlining the economic role of equity capital, which lies at the heart of the relationship 
between risk and return. It can be examined from two main angles, either as a ﬁ  nancing instrument or as 
a buffer in the event of a shock.
This study focuses on this second function, looking at it from a meso-economic perspective for which 
the use of central balance sheet ofﬁ  ces is particularly well suited. It sets out to describe the implications
of a crisis situation in terms of minimum capital requirements. A comparison is drawn between the 
situation of manufacturing sector companies in the four countries under review over the period 1987-2002
by means of several traditional indicators (income, equity capital), which resulted in the computation
of a Net Worth at Risk (NWaR) indicator. The NWaR ﬁ  gures are calibrated on the basis of an analysis
of the distribution of accounting losses (in particular at the 90th and 95th percentiles) calculated using 
company samples. They indicate the minimum capital that would be required in order to absorb any losses 
in the event of very unfavourable economic conditions.
The difference between NWaR and the observed level of equity capital gives us an indication of the 
number of companies for which the default rate is likely to increase signiﬁ  cantly in a crisis situation.
The proportion of companies that appear fragile in the event of a severe economic downturn is around 40%, 
as against 20% in a “normal” situation. However, this statistical analysis needs to be put into perspective.
In practice, only a minority of companies default, since the majority of them beneﬁ  t from protective measures 
implemented by their shareholders, managers and creditors to enable them to weather the downturn
and revive their activity.
In spite of the limitations of this indicator (which are also discussed in the study), these ﬁ  ndings will draw 
the attention of bank and company managers to the need to make ﬁ  nancial projections and credit risk 
assessments both in normal business conditions and crisis situations.
An approach based on net worth at risk sheds light on the determinants of a sound ﬁ  nancing structure
and encourages the development of an active approach to preventing corporate ﬁ  nancing problems.
1  The authors would like to thank the members of the working group and in particular Michel Delbreil (Banque de France, Chairman of the working group),
Ana Esteban (Banco de Espana), Franco Varetto, Vincenzo Favale (Centrale dei Bilanci, Italie), Dominik Elgg, Timm Körting (Deutsche Bundesbank). However, 
only the authors are accountable for the presentations of the ﬁ  ndings and the analyses developed in this article. The complete report of the working group, including 
the tables of sectoral ﬁ  ndings, can be downloaded from the Banque de France website at the address given in the bibliography of this article.ARTICLES
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1| THE ECONOMIC ROLE
  OF EQUITY CAPITAL
The question of the desirable level of equity capital 
arises when one starts to look at ways of measuring 
credit risk and choosing the best ﬁ  nancing structure. 
It should be considered both from the perspective 
of individual companies and from a meso-economic 
perspective based on a large sample of companies. 
As regards the question of the optimal ﬁ  nancing 
of the economy, if one were to interpret the
Modigliani-Miller theorem literally, one might be 
inclined to attach less importance to equity capital 
and instead to emphasise other indicators: cash 
ﬂ  ows, leverage effect, ability to repay debts, etc.
By demonstrating that, under certain conditions 
(such as perfect competition, making abstraction
of the tax-related bias), a company’s value is 
unrelated to its ﬁ  nancing  structure,  Modigliani
and Miller laid the foundations of corporate 
ﬁ  nancing approaches based on ﬂ  ow dynamics. These 
approaches completed the assets and liabilities 
approach which had been predominant up until 
then and still continues to inﬂ  uence the traditional 
banking approach to credit risk.
This viewpoint is of particular interest to economists 
concerned with the relationship between equity 
capital and economic growth. For example, the report 
co-sponsored by the World Bank “Doing Business 
in 2005 –Removing obstacles to growth”  looks 
at entrepreneurship in afﬁ  liated countries. This 
report highlights the links that may exist between 
institutional characteristics2 and the growth rate
of a country. Some of these relationships suggest 
that, if minimum capital requirements are initially 
too high, they are likely to hinder business creation. 
Others stress the importance of measures designed 
to protect “risk takers” (mainly creditors and capital 
investors) because these measures also play a role 
in making an economy more dynamic.
In order to ﬁ   nd a satisfactory answer to 
questions which seem to lead to contradictory 
recommendations, it appears relevant to combine 
two dimensions: risk and return.
Tying in risk with return enables us to look at the 
two functions of equity capital (i.e. protective buffer 
and source of ﬁ  nancing) under the same angle. This 
immediately sheds light on the economic function 
of equity capital, as compared to other sources 
of ﬁ  nancing, in particular in terms of preserving 
ﬁ  nancial stability, the key focus of this article.
Signiﬁ  cant advances were made by Knight (1921),3 
who introduced a breakdown of risk into
two categories, “measurable” and “unmeasurable” 
risk, and identiﬁ   ed the different economic 
behavioural patterns associated with each category. 
The measurable risk is deﬁ  ned as risk proper or 
“determinate uncertainty”. This uncertainty can 
be covered, for example by setting aside provisions 
which reduce the amount of proﬁ  ts paid to the 
entrepreneur-shareholder. The unmeasurable risk 
or “indeterminate uncertainty” represents the true 
risk taken by the entrepreneur that enables him to 
generate a proﬁ  t. Corporate equity embodies this 
type of risk. The greater the true risk, the higher 
the proﬁ  t potential. Knight goes one step further 
by pointing out that a large amount of equity 
capital should in principle reﬂ   ect a high level
of indeterminate uncertainty. In his book, he also 
touches on the issue of the relationship between 
the company and its creditors by showing that, in 
an uncertain environment, a company will ﬁ  nd 
it particularly difﬁ  cult to inspire conﬁ  dence on 
the part of its creditors if it has a small amount
of equity capital.
The relationship between uncertainty and ﬁ  nancing 
structure developed by Knight was taken a step 
further by Myers and Majluf (1996). They put 
forward an analytical framework explaining in what 
circumstances company managers suggest to their 
shareholders that the company be ﬁ  nanced preferably 
by a capital increase. They make the assumption 
that managers are always better informed than 
shareholders about the company’s future prospects. 
When managers are optimistic about the company’s 
prospects, they tend to favour debt security issuance 
because they are aware of equity prices’ potential 
to appreciate. In their opinion, shares are currently 
undervalued and it is therefore not in the interest
2  This report mainly sets out to establish a relationship between regulations and economic performance. The role of equity capital is not its main focus. However, 
the authors do take an interest in this issue insofar as they take a look at the obstacles to business creation and development. 
3  Knight does not view his work as the introduction of a new theory but rather as the structured and clariﬁ  ed presentation of previous concepts. He refers to the work 
of various German economists relative to proﬁ  t analysis and the ﬁ  rm, as well as work by Jean-Baptiste Say and Courcelle-Seneuil, the latter having studied the 
relationship between proﬁ  t and risk.ARTICLES
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of the company to ﬁ  nance itself at an undervalued 
issue price. Conversely, when managers are 
pessimistic about the company’s prospects, they 
are likely to issue new shares as they would raise 
equity capital with a signiﬁ  cant premium. From 
this standpoint, the level of equity capital is seen as 
relative and largely linked to the degree of uncertainty 
or expected “risk”. Furthermore, the existence of risk, 
which is the counterpart of a proﬁ  t maximisation 
strategy, justiﬁ  es the existence of a minimum amount
of equity capital.
2|  DIFFERENCES IN EQUITY RATIOS
  ACROSS COUNTRIES
The theoretical framework used to explain the 
role of equity capital could suggest that every 
company is subject to a universal law. In a context 
of ﬁ  nancial market globalisation driven by a global 
economic integration process, itself principally 
spurred by companies, one would expect the 
relative level of equity capital across countries to 
be somewhat similar.
However, even in a highly integrated economic area 
like the European Union, this does not appear to be 
the case.
This article looks at companies in the following 
four countries: Germany, Spain, France and Italy 
(see Appendix 1 for a presentation of the databases 
used). As shown in Chart 1, equity ratios4 differ 
substantially from one country to another.
Spanish ﬁ  rms have the highest equity ratio; the 
median of the ratio of equity capital to total assets was 
close to 40% from 1987 to 2002. Conversely, Italian 
and German companies appear less capitalised, 
with an equity ratio of around 20%. The situation
of French ﬁ  rms improved signiﬁ  cantly over this 
same period. In 1987, their equity ratio was close 
to that of Italian and German ﬁ  rms. In 2002, the 
median of the ratio of equity capital to total assets 
stood at roughly 30%, i.e. in an intermediate position. 
The same observations can be made when analysing 
overall distributions.5
In addition to the risk-return relationship on 
which economic literature tends to focus, speciﬁ  c 
equity capital differentiation factors also need to 
be taken into account in order to understand these 
differences. It is essential to identify these factors 
to correctly interpret the equity ratios, both for the 
purpose of individual company assessments and 
meso-economic analyses of ﬁ  nancing structures.
The statistical observations do not appear to be related 
to the sectoral composition of the four  national 
samples, because an analysis of the results by 
economic sector leads to the same conclusions. 
On the other hand, other structural factors such 
as company size, bank-ﬁ  rm relationships and the 
national legislations on collective proceedings 
introduce a number of differences and should 
therefore be given full attention.
Chart 1
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4  The indicator used is the ratio of equity capital to total assets. This enables us to offset the distortions linked to company size. It is also a more suitable indicator 
for conducting analyses of distributions and thus making cross-country comparisons. 
5  Detailed statistics are presented in the report of the working group, which can be downloaded from the Banque de France website.ARTICLES
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2|1 Size  effect
A number of ﬁ  ndings emerged from the analysis 
of the sub-sample of large companies (deﬁ  ned 
as companies with a turnover of more than
EUR 50 million). The equity ratio of Italian ﬁ  rms was 
very stable over the period under review, while that 
of Spanish ﬁ  rms showed pronounced ﬂ  uctuations 
in line with business cycle movements. In France, 
this ratio improved. It posted a signiﬁ  cant rise up
until 1994, then declined, but remained higher than 
in 1987. This swing could be due to the share buyback 
policy adopted by certain ﬁ  rms to raise their return 
on equity. At the end of the period under review, the 
equity ratio of large French ﬁ  rms was close to that 
of their Italian and German counterparts.
A comparison of the equity ratios of large ﬁ  rms 
with those of SMEs also brings to light a number 
of national differences. In Germany, and to a 
lesser extent in Spain, large companies are better 
capitalised than smaller ones. Conversely, in Italy, 
the disparities are less pronounced. In France, the 
equity ratio of large companies was higher than that 
of small ones during the ﬁ  rst half of the period, but 
in 2002, they were practically identical as the equity 
ratio of the largest ﬁ  rms had started to decline at the 
end of the 1990s.
2|2 Institutional  factors
According to Delbreil et al. (1997), the differences 
in equity ratios are largely attributable to structural 
factors.
First, the degree of legal protection of creditors 
differs from one country to the next. In Germany, 
for example, the law is very protective of creditors: 
they beneﬁ  t from a preferential right to payment in 
the event of the company’s bankruptcy. Similarly, 
in Italy, the law gives priority to secured creditors.   
Conversely, in France and Spain, commercial courts 
tend to give priority to salvaging companies rather 
than protecting the interests of secured creditors, 
in line with the objectives of the law on collective 
proceedings.6 This factor can –at least partly– explain 
the lower degree of capitalisation of German and 
Italian ﬁ  rms. Indeed, thanks to the protection from 
which they beneﬁ  t, creditors are less risk averse
–which implies lower minimum capital
requirements– than in Spain and France. This 
analysis is consistent with the work of Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) and La Porta et alii (1996).
Taxation and pension schemes can also explain 
differences in equity ratios. In Germany, pension 
provisions are very high and were for a long 
time considered as a substitute for equity, while 
in France –under the accounting framework 
prevailing during the period under review– pension 
payments are recorded as charges in the proﬁ  t 
and loss account and not as a future liability to be 
recorded in the balance sheet. The same holds true 
in Italy and Spain.
2|3  Access to sources of ﬁ  nancing:
 Bank-company  relationships,
 group  effect
Differences in equity ratios may be linked to the 
role played by the banking system. In this respect, 
the so-called Hausbank relationship which exists 
between German banks and their clients (especially 
SMEs) may explain the relatively low level of equity 
capital of German ﬁ  rms. In this system, banks 
and companies maintain a long-term and often 
exclusive relationship, such that the Hausbank is 
almost viewed as a partner involved in the smooth 
running of the company and not just as a mere fund 
provider. This structure contributes to reducing 
the information asymmetries that exist in a more 
traditional banking relationship and thus the amount 
of discrimination. The studies conducted by Elsas 
and Krahnen (1998) and Harhoff and Körting (1998) 
show that this practice contributes to an efﬁ  cient 
allocation of bank ﬁ   nancing and could partly 
explain why German companies are less inclined 
to seek alternative sources of ﬁ  nancing, such as 
equity ﬁ  nancing. The situation of Italian ﬁ  rms is 
diametrically opposed to that of German ﬁ  rms, but 
the results are the same. Traditionally, Italian ﬁ  rms 
have close ties with several banks and use multiple 
credit lines. Banks lower their risk by spreading their 
credit portfolio rather than properly assessing the 
creditworthiness of each company. Consequently, 
6  In France, the law on collective proceedings has just been substantially amended (Loi sur la sauvegarde des entreprises). One of the objectives of the law is to better 
protect creditors to encourage them to get more involved in ensuring the success of the conciliation and salvaging procedures. In view of these developments, the 
assessment made for the past 10 years could be altered over the medium-term.ARTICLES
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just like in Germany, Italian ﬁ  rms tend to have less 
recourse to equity ﬁ  nancing because bank credit is 
relatively accessible.
Furthermore, in Germany alternative sources
of ﬁ   nancing play an important role. Thus,
intra-group loans7 or loans from associated
companies and pension provisions add to equity 
capital, raising the amount of stable resources. 
Even though it is possible to provide a number
of explanations for the differences in equity ratios, 
the fact remains that the relationship between the 
way in which the economy is ﬁ  nanced and the level 
of equity capital is complex.
The analyses conducted by Rajan and Zingales (1995),
La Porta et alii (1996) and those by the European 
Committee of Central Balance Sheet Ofﬁ  ces (1997, 
2000) show that the countries where intermediated 
ﬁ   nancing is predominant are not necessarily 
those where companies appear the most indebted. 
Conversely, countries with highly developed 
ﬁ   nancial markets are not always those where 
companies’ equity ratio is the highest. They also
show that a higher corporate debt ratio is not 
necessarily associated with a more dynamic 
economic growth rate.  
According to the above-mentioned studies, the 
analysis of the growth patterns of the UK and German 
economies lends support to this viewpoint. German 
and UK ﬁ  rms post similar equity ratios, whereas the 
levels of bank intermediation and economic growth 
rates differ.
2|4 Differences
  in economic growth rates
In theory, there should not exist any medium to 
long term relationship between economic growth 
and companies’ equity ratios. Even though buoyant 
economic growth gives rise to higher proﬁ  ts, it also 
encourages the arrival of new companies –startups, 
foreign investors– which spurs competition and 
increases the pressure on proﬁ   ts. The number
of companies grows –and thus the overall amount 
of equity capital– but not the equity ratio of each 
individual company. However, when sectoral growth 
does not result in the arrival of new entrants, the 
relative level of proﬁ  ts and equity capital may 
increase for a short period, if the proﬁ  ts are not 
entirely distributed. Indeed, companies already 
present in that sector beneﬁ  t from an economic rent 
stemming from “barriers to entry”.
The trend in the equity ratio of Spanish 
manufacturing ﬁ  rms, compared with that in other 
countries reﬂ  ects the above-mentioned relationship. 
Although Spain posted a higher growth rate than 
its European counterparts over the period under 
review (see Chart 2), the equity ratio did not 
increase (true, in level terms, it is the highest
of the four samples). However, the economic recovery
of 1994-1995 enabled Spanish ﬁ   rms to rapidly
build up their equity capital again, following the 
recession of 1992-1993.
The comparative results obtained from the databases 
used in this study appear to be consistent with the 
conclusions of the theories underlying the differences 
in equity ratios and with other empirical studies on 
the subject. In particular, it seems important to stress 
the role played by institutional and legal factors. The 
differences in economic growth rates should also be 
taken into consideration.
The analysis of the economic role of equity capital 
contains two ideas: on the one hand, equity capital 
represents a source of corporate ﬁ  nancing that 
Chart 2
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7  In a consolidated approach, intra-group loans correspond to reciprocal transactions and are not included in the balance sheet presentation. This study is based 
on individual company accounts. Furthermore, a large number of holding companies are not part of the manufacturing sector and are not incorporated into the 
sample. This is why group ﬁ  nancing is considered as external ﬁ  nancing.ARTICLES
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must be properly balanced with respect to debt 
ﬁ  nancing, the other source of corporate ﬁ  nancing; 
on the other, equity capital represents a guarantee 
for creditors because it is intended to absorb losses 
and shield creditors in the event of a shock affecting 
the company. In this respect, it can be viewed as 
a ﬁ   nancial factor that contributes to ensuring
long-term growth.
This last role of equity capital, which can be described 
as “ﬁ  nancial stabiliser”, is particularly signiﬁ  cant 
in a context where credit institutions are required 
to set up internal credit risk rating systems as part
of the implementation of the Basel II Accord. Credit 
institutions are encouraged to test the information 
at their disposal from the point of view of its risk 
prediction capacity. In this respect, they are led to 
re-examine the role of equity capital as an indicator 
to be used for individual company assessments, 
in the light of the recent developments regarding 
accounting standards, the institutional context and 
companies’ ﬁ  nancing habits. 
In addition to modelling credit risk at the individual 
ﬁ  rm level, one should also look at the question of the 
optimal level of equity capital from a macroeconomic 
perspective. Although the stabilising role of equity 
capital has clearly been established by ﬁ  nancial 
theory, it has not yet been properly quantiﬁ  ed. This 
is why the “net worth at risk” indicator –described in 
the following section– was developed.
3| COMPUTING “NET WORTH AT RISK”
In order to compute the net worth at risk indicator, 
shortened to NWaR (Section 3|1), we ﬁ  rst  need 
to calculate the distribution of annual income
of manufacturing ﬁ   rms in the four economies 
(Section 3|2), then that of the estimated losses over a
two-year period (Section 3|3). These losses are used 
as a basis for calculating NWaR ﬁ  gures (Section 3|4). 
The difference between NWaR and equity capital 
gives us an indication of the proportion of companies 
whose equity capital alone would not be sufﬁ  cient to 
absorb losses in the event of a situation of stress (see 
Part 4), i.e. the largest losses incurred by the worst 
performing ﬁ  rms (90th and 95th centiles) and over the 
worst two years (conditional NWaR) or on average 
over the period 1987-2002 (unconditional NWaR).
3|1  The concept of net worth at risk
There are essentially two ways of measuring the 
resilience of a group of companies to an activity 
shock. The ﬁ  rst approach consists in modelling the 
impact of an exogenous shock (such as a sudden 
increase in commodity prices, a fall in demand, an 
exchange rate shock requiring a  sharp adjustment 
of proﬁ  t margins or a supply shock on the labour 
market) on companies’ operating ﬂ  ows and proﬁ  t 
and loss account. This approach requires making 
a number of assumptions on the elasticity of the 
different intermediate operating balances to such 
shocks and raises a few practical implementation 
difﬁ  culties, which are likely to affect the robustness 
of the results.8
The second approach –which we chose to adopt– 
focuses on equity capital and emphasises its role 
as buffer for losses. The NWaR indicator is derived 
from the accounting aggregate of net equity.
A distinction can then be made between “conditional” 
and “unconditional” NWaR.
Net equity is deﬁ  ned using the reference variables 
of the BACH database (Appendix):
+ Subscribed capital
+ Share issue, corporate merger and split premiums
+ Revaluation reserves
+ Other reserves
+ Net proﬁ  t or loss for the ﬁ  nancial year
+ Special tax-based reserves
– Uncalled or unpaid subscribed capital
– Intangible ﬁ  xed assets
We use the common deﬁ  nition of net equity, as it is 
obtained by deducting the “deferred charges” recorded 
under assets (and listed above) from the amount
of equity capital. However, in the rest of the article, 
we refer to “equity capital” for simplicity’s sake. 
Computing NWaR amounts to estimating equity ratios 
8  The Banque de France has, however, developed an individual assessment tool to conduct simulations according to different scenarios. This expert system for ﬁ  nancial 
analysis is part of a package available to SMEs that wish to test the ﬁ  nancial consistency of their projects or their resistance in certain business conditions.ARTICLES
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on the basis of the losses to be covered. It corresponds 
to the minimum equity capital, as a percentage of 
total assets, that a company would need to weather a
two-year recession if it were to incur the same amount 
of losses as that incurred by the worst performing ﬁ  rms 
following the shock. It is assumed that any company 
is likely to be among the 5% or 10% of the worst-hit 
companies. Box 1 describes the methodology used 
to compute this indicator and identify the recession 
years. NWaR then represents the potential losses that 
a company might incur, with a given probability of 
occurrence, and not the losses that a company would 
incur in the event of recession. When compared to 
total assets, NWaR can be viewed as a measure of the 
equity ratio that a company would need in order to 
develop its activity in a given sector. The riskier the 
sector, the greater the NWaR must be for the company 
to withstand the sectoral ﬂ  uctuations.
Box 1
Methodology for calculating net worth at risk (NWaR)
1| Databases used (see Appendix)
This study focuses on manufacturing sector companies with a turnover of over EUR 5 million; it does not include sole 
traders and partnerships. This gives us homogeneous and representatives samples of companies for the four countries 
under review. This study covers the manufacturing sector for two reasons. First, the databases used have a high coverage 
rate. Second, given that the manufacturing sector has always played a structuring role in the economic cycle, it seems 
particularly appropriate to study it in view of the purpose of this paper. The sample is not stable, i.e. the population of 
companies varies each year, according to arrivals (new companies or those whose turnover exceeds EUR 5 million for 
the ﬁ  rst time) and departures (mergers and acquisitions, defaults, other events). This enables us to have large samples 
over a long period.
2| Net worth at risk (NWaR)
The computation of NWaR is based on the calculation of losses to be covered. Three accounting variables are used: total 
assets, net equity and net income, the choice of which is explained in Appendix 1. The period under review is 1987-2002, 
which enables us to capture a variety of business cycle conﬁ  gurations in the countries under review. In order to establish 
a distribution of the cumulative results over a two-year period, we calculated two-year corporate proﬁ  ts and losses, for 
each company and each sector.
The statistical distributions of these 15 two-year periods enabled us to identify the 90th and 95th percentile values of net 
losses (i.e. the ratio between net accounting losses and total assets).
The NWaR ﬁ  gures correspond to the average values of the two-year losses (90th and 95th percentile) over a given period. 
The 85th and 99th percentile values were also calculated. The 85th percentile does not provide more information than the 
90th percentile, while the 99th percentile yields partly unrealistic results due to the existence of extreme values, and in 
particular in the case of a segmentation by size or sector, it does not include a sufﬁ  cient number of observations to be 
properly interpreted. 
It is worthwhile comparing the signiﬁ  cance of the percentiles in this study with that of the quantiles that credit institutions use 
to model risk according to the Basel II recommendations. Under Basel II, the 99.9th quantile represents the boundary between 
losses to be covered and losses which, with a 0.1% probability of occurrence, correspond to the indeterminate uncertainty. 
The 95th percentile in this study represents the amount of equity capital necessary to cover the losses of 95% of companies. 
This threshold might appear less strict than that for credit institutions. However, it is calculated on the basis of the losses 
incurred by the 5% of companies showing the highest level of debt and then applied to all companies, some of which are
in reality hardly likely to incur losses thanks to their speciﬁ  c competitive position. It is therefore a very cautious approach.
3| Deﬁ  nition of recession periods
Underlying our deﬁ  nition of recession periods is a speciﬁ  c multicriteria approach applied homogeneously to all four countries. 
In view of the objectives of the study, the deﬁ  nition generally used by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 
based on the analysis of quarterly GDP statistics, did not seem totally appropriate. Indeed, the focus of this study is on 
the manufacturing sector and its sub-sectors and our objective was therefore to identify the recession periods speciﬁ  c to 
these sectors. Furthermore, given the nature of the test (stress test), it was decided to consider a more violent shock than 
that resulting from a macroeconomic recession as deﬁ  ned by the NBER, i.e. a period of two consecutive years, in order ARTICLES
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3|2  Distribution of annual income
The distribution of the net income/total assets ratio for 
manufacturing sector companies differs substantially 
from one country to the next. Chart 3 shows the
ﬁ  rst decile and the three quartiles of this distribution 
in 2002, the last year in the period under review.
According to the net income/total assets ratio, 
Italian ﬁ  rms are less proﬁ  table than their foreign 
counterparts: for 50% of ﬁ  rms, net income accounts 
for less than 1% of total assets. Spanish, French and 
German ﬁ  rms appear more proﬁ  table. In the last 
quartile, German ﬁ  rms show particularly high net 
income/total assets ratios (over 9.1%).
The picture changes if one looks at the ﬁ  rst decile 
of the distribution, which is made up of the worst 
performing companies and where negative values 
mean that companies are incurring losses. In the ﬁ  rst 
to clearly establish a relationship between the macroeconomic context and corporate performance on the one hand, and 
between equity capital and losses on the other. We thus used a deﬁ  nition based on the accounts of the companies under 
review. The following three criteria were taken into consideration: the 90th percentile of the distribution of net losses, the 
annual change of value added derived from corporate balance sheet data, the annual change of value added derived from 
the national accounts. A year was considered as recessionary if it was highlighted by at least two indicators; the periods
of two consecutive recessionary years were then identiﬁ  ed. This procedure resulted in the years 1992-1993 being identiﬁ  ed 
as a recession period for all four countries. For some sub-sectors, other two-year periods were brought to light and used 
in a sectoral analysis (not covered in this article).
4| Conditional and non-conditional NWaR 
Two NWaR values were calculated for the identiﬁ  ed recession period (1992-1993). They correspond to the 90th and 95th 
percentiles of the distribution of net losses over the two-year period. They are deemed conditional, because their value 
depends on the occurrence of a recession, as deﬁ  ned above. 
Two other NWaR values were calculated. They correspond to the average of net losses over the 1987-2002 period, for the 
same percentiles as above. They are deemed unconditional because they are based on an entire economic cycle.
5 | Differences between Value at Risk and Net Worth at Risk
Value at Risk corresponds to the maximum portfolio losses that an economic agent can incur over a speciﬁ  c period
of time with a given conﬁ  dence level. VaR is calculated on the basis of market prices, which are made available at frequent 
intervals (in general, daily). VaR depends on the period chosen. Its robustness depends on the extent to which market 
prices during the period under review are assumed to be representative of potential future developments. It also relies on 
other assumptions, such as the probability distribution, stationarity, market liquidity, etc. VaR gives the value of economic 
capital necessary to cover unexpected losses and can be used to differentiate between expected losses (covered by 
provisions, etc.) and unexpected losses.
By contrast, the computation of NWaR is based on corporate accounting data, in accordance with the historical cost 
convention. This convention provides an imperfect proxy for market prices (when these are available). The statistical 
distribution of losses is directly derived from the observation of historical series and the distinction between expected 
losses and unexpected losses is not applicable in this context. 
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9  Explaining the difference between these two country rankings is not easy. On the one hand, as higher risks tend to be remunerated by larger proﬁ  ts, the ranking 
could reﬂ  ect a ranking of the level of credit risk in the four countries during the period under review. This argument could partly explain the case of German 
ﬁ  rms. However, it does not account for all situations: Spanish ﬁ  rms for example are highly proﬁ  table without incurring signiﬁ  cant losses. Other factors, such as 
institutional, accounting and tax-related factors, should also probably be taken into account. 
decile, Spanish companies display the best results, i.e. 
relatively small losses, while Italian ﬁ  rms show lower 
losses than their French and German counterparts.9ARTICLES
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One should nevertheless not draw hasty conclusions 
as to the ranking of countries. Indeed, the indicator 
used is based on net income, which depends on the 
type of accounting convention applied and possibly 
on companies’ tax optimisation behaviour.
On the other hand, the differences in performance 
across countries seem to reﬂ  ect  contrasting 
economic conditions. In the Italian manufacturing 
sector, for example, the dispersion of results is less 
wide than in other countries, in particular France 
and Germany. An analysis of net income in the
1st decile and the median over the whole period 
also brings to light the somewhat unique situation
of Italian ﬁ  rms. Italy’s speciﬁ  c policy mix in the 
early 1990s, consisting of a depreciation in the lira 
and an accommodating ﬁ  scal policy might have 
enabled the least proﬁ  table companies to remain in 
activity, without necessarily raising the proﬁ  tability 




  of the two-year losses distribution
In the rest of the study, we clarify and deepen 
the assessments made in the previous section by 
examining the 90th and 95th percentiles of the net 
losses/total assets ratio, which correspond to the
ﬁ  rst decile (or 10th percentile) and 5th percentile 
of the net income distribution (Chart 4). These 
percentiles are made up of companies incurring 
net losses. The following observations can be made 
regarding the changes in these percentiles over the 
entire period under review.
First, all four countries show very large losses in 
1992-1993. These two years are therefore identiﬁ  ed 
as a recession period, according to the procedure 
described in Box 1.
Generally speaking, the 95th percentile yields the 
same results as the 90th percentile in terms of the 
ranking of countries according to the net losses/total 
assets ratio in the manufacturing sector.
Chart 3b
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The losses incurred by Spanish ﬁ   rms in the
95th percentile are signiﬁ  cantly higher during the 
recession period (accounting for 35% of total assets) 
than those recorded as from the mid-1990s (just 
over 5%).10 This can be attributed to the progressive 
convergence of Spain’s macroeconomic indicators 
towards those of its European counterparts. At the 
start of the 1990s, Spain posted high inﬂ  ation and 
Spanish interest rates were well above those in 
Germany and France. Interest payments represented 
a heavy burden on indebted ﬁ  rms, thus hindering 
their performance even further. Since the mid-1990s, 
the catching-up process of the Spanish economy 
and the convergence of interest rates prior to 
Spain’s adoption of the euro led to a narrowing of 
the gap in ﬁ  nancing costs between the European 
economies under review. Benito et al. (2004) have 
given empirical evidence of the positive effect
of convergence in interest rates on the proﬁ  tability 
of Spanish ﬁ  rms.11
The 95th percentile also highlights the particularity 
of Italian manufacturing ﬁ   rms, as pointed out 
in section 3.2: Italian ﬁ  rms incurred lower losses 
during the 1992-1993 recession than their French 
and German counterparts. Since the mid-1990s, 
the 95th percentile of two-year losses for French 
and German ﬁ  rms has followed a similar pattern. 
However, the recession weighed more heavily on 
German ﬁ  rms, weakened by reuniﬁ  cation.
To sum up, as shown in Chart 4, the amplitude
of the economic cycle and the strength of previous 
recessions are shown to have a signiﬁ  cant impact on 
companies’ ﬁ  nancial situation.
3|4  Conditional and unconditional NWaR
The 90th and 95th percentiles of two-year losses 
determine two values of NWaR. Conditional NWaR 
represents the net losses that a company may have 
to absorb during a two-year recession period if this 
company were to incur the same amount of losses 
as that incurred by the worst performing companies 
in the past. This two-year recession represents a
worst-case scenario in the light of the events recorded 
over the 15 years under review. Of course, it is not 
necessarily predictive of what may happen in the 
future. It nevertheless gives us an indication of the 
“cushion” of equity capital that would be needed to 
absorb the losses that a company may incur during 
a severe crisis in the event that it should not have 
taken any protective measures.
As shown in Chart 4, the years 1992-1993 have been 
identiﬁ  ed as a recession period for all four countries 
under review. It should be recalled that this study 
sets out to examine companies’ resilience to a severe 
recession, irrespective of the nature of the recession, 
on the understanding that the combination of factors 
that brought about the 1992-1993 recession cannot 
occur twice (see Box 1 and section 3|5 below).
Chart 5 shows both the conditional NWaR values 
(computed on the basis of the 90th and 95th percentiles 
for the years 1992-1993) and the unconditional 
NWaR values, which correspond to the respective 
averages of the 90th and 95th percentiles over the 
1987-2002 period.
Spanish ﬁ   rms post the highest conditional 
NWaR values, both in the 95th percentile and the
90th percentile. This ﬁ  nding is in line with the fact that 
the income of Spanish manufacturing ﬁ  rms is highly 
cyclical (see Chart 3). German ﬁ  rms rank second: 
the 5% most vulnerable ﬁ  rms post NWaR values of 
Chart 5
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10  Over this same period, the 90th percentile of the distribution is positive, reﬂ  ecting the fact that less than 10% of Spanish companies incur losses. 
11  Another explanation could be the fact that, following the substantial losses incurred in 1992-1993, a large number of Spanish ﬁ  rms either went bankrupt or were 
restructured. The general restructuring drive that followed was then reﬂ  ected in the proﬁ  tability distribution.ARTICLES
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over 26.2% during a crisis period. For France and Italy, 
these ﬁ  gures are 22.5% and 18.5% respectively.
The ranking of countries is different if one looks at 
the unconditional NWaR. German manufacturing 
ﬁ  rms show the highest unconditional NWaR values, 
followed by French and Spanish ﬁ  rms. Italian ﬁ  rms 
continue to perform relatively well, recording the 
lowest unconditional NWaR values.
This change in the ranking of countries highlights 
the different information content of the conditional 
and unconditional NWaR. The conditional NWaR 
gives an indication of the amount of equity capital 
that relatively fragile companies need to weather 
a recession. The unconditional NWaR provides a 
measure of the amount of equity capital necessary 
to support relatively fragile companies throughout 
an economic cycle. 
The size of the differential between conditional 
and unconditional NWaR provides the following 
information:
• it is an indication of the extent to which companies 
restructured their balance sheet12 and improved 
their performance between the trough of the cycle 
and the cycle trend, for a given percentile;
• if one considers that this indicator is a proxy for 
credit risk, the differential between conditional and 
unconditional NWaR is an indication of the migration 
of companies between high risk categories and low 
and average risk categories. 
The situation of Spanish ﬁ  rms is particularly 
noteworthy: the differential between conditional 
and unconditional NWaR amounts to 22.7 points, 
pointing to signiﬁ  cant  restructuring  efforts 
and/or a substantial rise in proﬁ  tability13 after 
the recession. The differential for German and 
Italian ﬁ  rms (7.5 points) probably reﬂ  ects the 
combination of two phenomena: a less pronounced 
restructuring process on account of the lesser 
intensity of the recession and slower growth in 
productivity gains and proﬁ  tability. In France 
(10-point differential), the restructuring drive, 
which had started in 1992-1993, continued until 
1995-1996 as part of the French “competitiveness 
through disinﬂ  ation” policy.
3|5 Need  for  caution
  in interpreting the results
Caution should be exercised when interpreting 
the results relative to net worth at risk. First, this 
is a worst-case scenario approach, reﬂ  ecting the 
risk borne by the 5% or 10% worst performing 
ﬁ  rms. Furthermore, the estimated potential losses 
obviously depend on the extent of the recession. 
Thus, the recession in Europe in 1992-1993 hit a 
group of interdependent economies, each with its 
own national currency and therefore confronted by 
foreign exchange crises. For the four countries under 
review, the monetary context has changed and a 
recessionary shock in today’s new environment 
would have different consequences. It should also 
be stressed that each ﬁ  rm is faced with speciﬁ  c 
factors (dependence on suppliers and clients, 
ﬂ  exibility of the production structure, change in 
competitive pressure, etc.) which have an impact 
on its performance. It is therefore not possible to use 
the NWaR concept to estimate the individual default 
probabilities. NWaR provides information on the risk 
proﬁ  le of large sectors or groups of companies, but 
should not be used for individual assessments. 
Bearing this in mind, a comparison of NWaR 
ﬁ  gures and equity ratios (see section 4|3) in the 
four economies under review suggests that NWaR 
could be an explanatory factor underlying the equity 
ratio. Spanish ﬁ  rms record the largest losses during 
a recession, both in the 90th and 95th percentiles, as 
well as high equity ratios. The situation of Italian 
ﬁ  rms is diametrically opposed to that of Spanish 
ﬁ  rms, with relatively small losses and low equity 
ratios. French ﬁ  rms are somewhere in between, 
showing moderate NWaR and equity ratios. In all 
of these cases, there appears to be a relationship 
between the equity ratio and companies’ sensitivity 
to business cycle variations. The more companies 
are sensitive to these ﬂ  uctuations, in particular 
recessions, the larger the cushion of equity capital 
will have to be.
12  As the sample is not constant, defaulting companies are excluded from the sample from one year to the next, which automatically alters the value of the percentiles, 
in particular the highest ones.
13  Measured by the amount of losses incurred. ARTICLES
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These elements should, however, be set back 
within a wider context. The fact that NWaR may 
be viewed as a determinant of the equity ratio does 
not call into question the relevance of the other 
factors highlighted above. This is illustrated by the 
case of German ﬁ  rms, which show both high NWaR 
and lower equity ratios than the other countries 
under review.
4|  COMPARING NET WORTH AT RISK
  AND EQUITY CAPITAL
Comparing NWaR ﬁ  gures with equity ratios for 
a given year is straightforward. By substracting 
the NWaR value from the equity ratio for each 
company we obtain the proportion of companies 
that don’t have sufﬁ  cient equity capital to weather a
two-year recession should they incur the same 
amount of losses (as a percentage of total assets) 
as the worst performing companies in the past. 
Chart 6 shows the proportion of countries with an 
equity ratio below the NWaR (95th  percentile) for the 
four countries under review. From a meso-economic 
perspective, this can be viewed as the amount
of equity capital covering the losses incurred
by 95% of companies i.e. a residual risk of 5%. 
Of course, these results are obtained on the 
assumption that all other things are equal. The 
ﬁ  nancial system’s reaction to a deterioration in 
companies’ ﬁ  nancing structure could have a positive 
or negative impact on the results, depending on 
banks’ ability to prevent some of their clients from 
defaulting or the support they provide to their 
clients in difﬁ  cult situations. In France, depending 
on their perception of the relative effectiveness 
of the various possible approaches (measured in 
terms of their capacity to minimise the amount 
of unrecoverable losses), credit institutions 
may choose either to opt for conciliation or an
out-of-court settlement or have recourse to collective 
proceedings. This choice may also depend on the 
speciﬁ  c situation of each bank, in terms of liquidity 
and therefore its ability to bear a more or less 
signiﬁ  cant transformation or illiquidity risk.
The situation of German manufacturing ﬁ  rms 
differs markedly from that in other European 
countries. A very large proportion of ﬁ  rms (55% 
in the 95th  percentile in 2002) post an equity ratio 
below the conditional NWaR. Conversely, since 
1990, France has shown the best performance 
(32% in the 95th percentile in 2002). The decline 
in the proportion of French manufacturing ﬁ  rms 
with an equity ratio below NWaR can be attributed 
to the increase in equity capital during the period 
under review. In Spain and Italy, the proportion
of companies in this situation is similar, i.e. close 
to 45% in 2002. The same results can be obtained 
with the 90th percentile.
Although these results are generally attributable
to both equity capital and potential losses incurred 
in the event of a recession, in the case of Germany 
they mainly stem from a lower equity ratio than 
in the other European countries. In the light
of the NWaR values obtained, it seems that German 
ﬁ  rms could be encouraged to alter their ﬁ  nancial 
management in order to raise their level of equity 
capital. It should be noted that this assumption 
concerning the behaviour of German ﬁ  rms is in 
line with the concerns expressed in other studies 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2003), in particular in 
the framework of the implementation of Basel II.
The slight increase in equity ratios recorded in 2002 
could be the ﬁ  rst step in this direction.
Despite being relatively high, the equity ratios 
of a large proportion of Spanish ﬁ  rms are below 
NWaR, on account of the signiﬁ  cant losses incurred 
during the recession. As regards the unconditional 
NWaR, Spanish ﬁ  rms show more favourable results. 
Indeed, the unconditional NWaR is an indicator 
Chart 6
Proportion of companies with an equity ratio below 
NWaR (95th percentile)
Manufacturing sector (NACE: D)
(%)










1989 1987 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001ARTICLES
Corporate equity and ﬁ  nancial stability: An approach based on net worth at risk
Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 8 • May 2006  107
which smooths out the amplitude of business cycle 
ﬂ  uctuations and only the trend economic growth 
rate is (indirectly) reﬂ  ected in its calculation.14
Italian ﬁ  rms are also in an intermediate position. 
In this case, however, their situation stems from a 
combination of a relatively small amount of losses 
and a low equity ratio.
In terms of their NWaR, French ﬁ  rms appear to 
have the largest resistance capacity to a cyclical 
shock. This can be attributed both to high equity 
ratios, which increased throughout the period, and 
relatively moderate losses during the 1992-1993 
14  If one accepts the assumption that companies show better results in a context of strong economic growth. This is highly likely given that established ﬁ  rms are the 
ﬁ  rst ones to take advantage of the new business opportunities arising from economic growth, before having to face competition from new entrants, which eventually 
leads to the convergence of results towards a long-term equilibrium.
recession. As regards the unconditional NWaR, 
the results are less good. In France, the proportion
of ﬁ  rms for which the level of equity capital is 
below average two-year losses over the 1987-2002 
period is high compared with that in Spain and 
Italy (but close to that in Germany). This could 
mean that poorly capitalised French ﬁ  rms continue 
to develop their activity for various reasons
(bank support, alternative sources of ﬁ  nancing, 
such as intragroup loans and trade credit). But it also 
points to their vulnerability, in terms of ensuring 
a proper balance of their sources of ﬁ  nancing, to 
which shareholders and business partners should 
give their full attention.
The trends recorded by French manufacturing ﬁ  rms between 1987 and 2002 continued in 2003 and 2004.
Net income and equity capital continued to post a slight rise.
In the 95th percentile, the proportion of companies with an equity ratio below NWaR during a recession is at its lowest in 2004, 
at 30.8% (3,826 companies out of 12,417).This decrease is in parallel with the downward trend in the company default rates 
recorded over the period.
Box 2
Recent trends recorded by French ﬁ  rms
Equity capital of French ﬁ  rms
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In this study, we have expanded on the concept of net worth at risk (NWaR), deﬁ  ned as the equity capital 
that would be needed to absorb the losses incurred by a company if it were to incur the same amount of 
losses as that of the worst performing ﬁ  rms over a given period (at the 90th and 95th percentiles of the 
losses distribution). A distinction is made between the concepts of conditional NWaR (calculated on the 
basis of the losses incurred during the 1992-1993 recession) and unconditional NWaR (calculated on the 
basis of the average losses over the whole period 1987-2002).
The results obtained for the four countries are different.
The proportion of Italian and Spanish ﬁ  rms for which the conditional NWaR is above their equity ratio
in 2002 (at a 90% and 95% level of conﬁ  dence) is similar, i.e. roughly 45%. In the Italian case, however, 
this situation is due to the low level of equity capital and the small amount of losses.
German ﬁ  rms post less favourable results: for over 60% of ﬁ  rms the conditional NWaR is greater than their 
equity ratio in 2002. This situation does not necessarily imply greater vulnerability, because it probably 
results from a speciﬁ  c ﬁ  nancing structure stemming in part from the strong Hausbank relationship between 
companies and banks. Furthermore, the proportion of banks in this situation declined slightly in 2002, the 
last year of the period under review.
The proportion of French ﬁ  rms for which the conditional NWaR is above their equity ratio in 2002 is lower 
(30%) than in the other European countries. This largely reﬂ  ects company managers’ drive to strengthen 
their ﬁ  nancial structure during the period under review, as well as the moderate losses recorded during 
the 1992-1993 recession.
As regards the unconditional NWaR, i.e. the average losses incurred by the most highly indebted ﬁ  rms 
over the entire period 1987-2002, French ﬁ  rms show the same degree of vulnerability as German ﬁ  rms 
(roughly 15% to 20%), yet they do not enjoy a Hausbank-type relationship with their bank.
If one considers that NWaR represents a proxy for credit risk, the differential between conditional and 
unconditional NWaR would imply that the proportion of high-risk companies in a credit portfolio can be 
multiplied by two between a “normal” period and a period of signiﬁ  cant stress.
In this context, the ﬁ  nancial partners of these ﬁ  rms should make them more aware of the importance 
of ﬁ  nancial factors and contribute to rebalancing the ﬁ  nancing structure of the most vulnerable ones
in the framework of an approach aimed at preventing corporate failure. Credit institutions must establish 
a dialogue with companies in view of the implementation of Basel II and explain to them the way in which 
their position on a standardised risk scale determines their credit policy. This dialogue can be viewed 
as going hand in hand with the improvement in information and internal ratings systems conducted
by banks in the framework of Basel II. Banks would probably need to enhance their commercial strategy 
by systematically including information on credit risk factors.
More generally, computing and studying the NWaR indicator contributes to a better understanding of the 
determinants of companies’ ﬁ  nancing structure. 
Bearing in mind the fact that it should not be used to assess individual company risk, this indicator has a 
meso-economic purpose. It contributes to improving the monitoring of company credit risk. It supplements 
the information provided by scores and ratings –which are generally available in the case of a stable 
economic environment– by an approach to risk in the case of exceptional economic tensions.ARTICLES
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APPENDIX
Databases and methodology 
The data used are drawn from the individual company databases managed by the Deutsche Bundesbank,
the Banco d’Espana, the Centrale dei Bilanci and the Banque de France. Given the conﬁ  dentiality of the 
data, each institution processed its own data according to a common methodology and the results –rendered 
anonymous– were pooled in order to compare them. The accounting concepts were drawn from national charts 
of accounts, which could be compared by means of a conversion table, developed by the European Committee 
of Central Balance Sheet Ofﬁ  ces in order to handle the BACH harmonised company accounts database. Accounts 
are “harmonised” as national charts of accounts are drawn up in accordance with the Fourth Council Directive 
and using similar implicit conceptual frameworks. 
The databases used in the study contain more than 10,000 companies for each country (see table below).
These databases were not designed to obtain a set of representative statistics, but rather to have detailed 
accounting data, in particular for the purpose of risk analysis. However, thanks to the relatively large number 
of companies in the samples, the results were representative of the general situation of companies, especially 
as observations were made over a long period.
We used three accounting variables: total assets, net equity and net income. The four countries display similar 
ﬁ  nancing structures (in particular, the bank intermediation rate and the role of trade credit). Furthermore, 
only manufacturing sector companies are within the scope of the study. These characteristics limit any
cross-country comparison biases. The variables were standardised by means of ratios (net equity/total assets, 
net income/total assets), in order not to skew the results due to size effects. Lastly, net income was chosen over 
other intermediate operating balances (which are representative of companies’ current performance), given 
that the purpose of the study is to measure losses eroding net equity, i.e. ﬁ  nal losses. We chose to estimate
two-year losses in order to smooth any possible volatility in the proﬁ  t and loss account balance, as losses over two 
consecutive years generally reﬂ  ect a structural deﬁ  cit denoting deﬁ  cits on all of the intermediate balances.
The table below gives an indication of the representativeness of the databases in 2000. Values for the other 
years may be slightly different as the samples are not stable from one year to the next. Representativeness 
indicators differ somewhat across countries on account of institutional factors.
Manufacturing industry (NACE: D)








Number of companies 11,709 20,906 10,464 22,052
of which: companies with a turnover 
of over EUR 50 millions 1,706 347 1,845 1,832
Coverage rate  90.1%a) 100%b) 79.6%c) 100%d)
(a) As a % of total company turnover, drawn up by the tax authorities.
(b) As a % of the number of manufacturing companies included in the Directorio Central de Empresias database produced by INE, the Spanish national statistics institute.
(c) As a % of the workforce employed recorded by INSEE (the INSEE database covers all companies taxed on industrial and commercial proﬁ  ts on the basis of real
and normal proﬁ  ts –BIC-BRN).
(d) As a % of limited liability companies recorded in the database of the national statistics institute.ARTICLES
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